

# Does the Form of Regulation Matter?

An Empirical Analysis of Regulation and Land Productivity Growth


*via a cooperative agreement sponsored by the U.S. Department of Agriculture*

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# Regulation & Agricultural Productivity



- Limited and inconclusive empirical evidence on the overall impact of regulation on productivity growth
- No systematic analysis of different forms of regulation

# Research Questions

- What is the relationship between growth in agriculture-related regulation and agricultural productivity growth?
- Does the relationship vary depending on the form of regulation?

## Preview of Findings

- The empirical analysis suggests that growth in total regulation has a negative relationship with land productivity growth.
- The relationship differs depending on the form of regulation.
  - Command-and-control and entry-and-exit regulations
  - Information-based and transfer regulations

# Methodology

- Coverage: 25 crop production industries (6-digit NAICS)  
661 parts in Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
- Timeframe: 1971-2017
- Measuring growth in agricultural productivity
  - Land productivity: crop yield per acre
- Measuring growth in regulation
  - Amount of regulation: restrictive word count
  - Form of regulation: A Taxonomy of Regulatory Forms

# A Taxonomy of Regulatory Forms

	First-Tier Form	Second-Tier Form	Third-tier Form	
1	Economic	Price	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Benchmarking (or yardstick)</li> <li>▪ Price ceiling/floor</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Rate of return</li> <li>▪ Revenue cap</li> </ul>
		Quantity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Obligation to serve</li> <li>▪ Portfolio standards</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Rationing and quotas</li> </ul>
		Entry & Exit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Certification of need</li> <li>▪ Licensing</li> <li>▪ Rivalrous/exclusive permits</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Certification</li> <li>▪ Antitrust</li> </ul>
		Service Quality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Product identity or grades</li> <li>▪ Quality levels</li> </ul>	
2	Social	Command-and-Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)</li> <li>▪ Performance standards</li> <li>▪ Means-based standards</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Permitting</li> <li>▪ Pre-market notice</li> <li>▪ Pre-market approval</li> <li>▪ Prohibitions</li> </ul>
		Market-based	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Bonds</li> <li>▪ Marketable permits</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Subsidies</li> <li>▪ Taxes and fees</li> </ul>
		Information-based	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Hazard warning</li> <li>▪ Labeling</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Other disclosure</li> <li>▪ Contingency planning</li> </ul>
3	Transfer	Transfer	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Monetary transfer</li> <li>▪ Technology transfer</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ User fees</li> <li>▪ Knowledge transfer</li> </ul>
4	Administrative	Administrative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Definitions</li> <li>▪ Government action</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Organizational</li> </ul>

# Model 1: Total Regulation

$$YG_{i,t} = \beta_1 TRG_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 disaster_{i,t} + \mu_i + \gamma_1 trend_t + \gamma_2 trend_t^2 + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

where:

- $i$  is the  $i$ th 6-digit NAICS industry,  $t$  is the  $t$ th year
- $YG_{i,t}$  is the weighted average of the annual growth rate in yield of all crops relevant to industry  $i$  in year  $t$
- $TRG_{i,t-1}$  is the annual growth rate of the restrictive word count in all CFR parts relevant to industry  $i$  in year  $t - 1$
- $disaster_{i,t}$  is industry  $i$ 's exposure to natural disasters in year  $t$ .
- $\mu_i$  is the 6-digit NAICS industry fixed effects
- $trend_t$  is the time trend, and  $trend_t^2$  is the time trend squared


# Model 2: Regulatory Form

$$YG_{i,t} = \beta_1 RFG_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 TRG_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 Disaster_{i,t} + \mu_i + \gamma_1 trend_t + \gamma_2 trend_t^2 + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$


where:

- $RFG_{i,t-1}$  is the annual growth rate of the restrictive word count in the CFR parts that take a particular regulatory form (e.g., command-and-control regulation) for industry  $i$  in year  $t - 1$ .

# Data: Yield Growth




Average Yield Growth for All Industries, 1970-2017






# Data: Regulatory Form




Industry	Year	Relevant parts	Restrictive word count	Regulatory forms	Restrictions (total)	Restrictions 111	Restrictions 112	Restrictions 113
111110	2017	1 CFR 1	10	111	10 + 50 + 20	10 + 50/2	50/2 + 20/2	20/2 = 10
		1 CFR 2	50	111, 112	= 80	= 35	= 35	
		1 CFR 3	20	112, 113				

# Data: Regulatory Form



Average Annual Growth in Total Regulatory Restrictions, 1970-2017



# Results: Total Regulation

Dependent Var: yield_growth	OLS	OLS + Time Trend	Industry FE	Industry FE + Time Trend	Industry FE + Time Trend
Growth in total regulatory restrictions	-0.2672**	-0.2895**	-0.2634***	-0.2863***	-0.3668***
Disaster risk					-0.0320***
Time		-0.1092		-0.0962	-0.0493
Time2		0.0020		0.0016	0.0012
Observations	928	928	928	928	685
R-squared	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.022
Prob > F	0.0213	0.1270	0.0050	0.0240	0.0002
Number of industries			25	25	19

Note: Constant estimates are omitted. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

# Results: Second-Tier Regulatory Forms

Dep. Var.: yield_growth	FE + Time Trend	FE + Time Trend (Control for Disaster)
Command-and-control	-0.3041***	-0.4081***
Entry-and-exit	-0.1363*	-0.1753**
Administrative	-0.1330***	-0.1319**
Service quality	-0.0331	0.0119

Dep. Var.: yield_growth	FE + Time Trend	FE + Time Trend (Control for Disaster)
Transfer	0.3490**	0.5073***
Information-based	0.0950**	0.0931**
Market-based	0.0124	-0.0449
Quantity	0.0098	0.0025
Price	0.0084	0.0109

Note: Coefficients on growth in regulatory restrictions for each regulatory form; other coefficients are omitted. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

# Results: Third-Tier Regulatory Forms

## Entry-and-Exit Regulation

Dep. Var.: yield_growth	FE + Time Trend	FE + Time Trend (Control for Disaster)
Certification	-0.1076**	-0.1517***
Licensing	-0.0554	-0.0586

## Command-and-Control Regulation

Dep. Var.: yield_growth	FE + Time Trend	FE + Time Trend (Control for Disaster)
MRV	-0.2272***	-0.3331***
Permitting	-0.0138	-0.1827***
Performance standards	-0.0438	-0.0465
Means-based standards	-0.0145	-0.0098
Pre-market notice & approval	-0.0015	-0.0030
Prohibitions	-0.0005	-0.0006**

Note: Coefficients on regulatory forms from industry FE + time trend specifications; other coefficients are omitted. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

# Robustness Checks

- 1) Using an alternative approach to distribute restrictive word counts by form
- 2) Adjusting restrictions for MRV
- 3) Using total word counts
- 4) Using expert judgment to exclude possibly irrelevant CFR parts

Overall, the relationships found in the baseline models are unaffected or even reinforced.

# Implications

- Not only more or less regulation, but regulatory form may have an impact on economic consequences.
- Command-and-control regulation may be costly and inflexible, and harm productivity growth.
  - MRV and permitting requirements may impose a substantial burden on productivity growth.
- Entry-and-exit regulation, and certification requirements in particular, may slow down productivity growth.
- Transfer regulation may enhance productivity growth.
- Information-based regulation may help regulated entities recognize the risks in their operations, eventually promoting productivity growth.

# Limitations & Future Research

- Measure of regulation
- Identifying industry-relevant regulations
- Relatively small sample size for certain regulatory forms
- Correlation rather than causation
  
- Broader application of the Taxonomy of Regulatory Forms



# Regulatory Studies Center

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An earlier draft of the Taxonomy of Regulatory Forms:  
<https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/taxonomy-regulatory-forms>

A full report coming soon!